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The pUblication of this volume fulfills one of my fondest expecta­
tions. As I wrote in the introduction to The Silent World of Doctor 
and Patient; 1 
[the] ultimate purpose [of my book] is to initiate a more enlightened 
debate about the respective rights, duties, and needs of physicians 
and patients in their intimate, anxiety-producing, and fateful en­
counters with one another. . .. The problems of ... greater patient 
participation in the medical decision-making process ... deserve 
study and their in-depth analysis must be extended beyond where I 
leave off. . .. [M]any additional leads need to be pursued. In this 
book I have been unable to explore any to their depth. Instead, I 
have tried to identify as many issues as possible and to pursue them 
for some distance (pp. xiii, xix, xx). 
The editors of the Western New England Law Review responded to 
my hopes and I am grateful to them for the loving care with which 
they executed this project. 
The largely unexplored and controversial issues that I identify in 
my book have been neglected for too long. Among these issues, one is 
most basic: my assertions that the responsible practice of medicine 
demands caring attention not only to patients' physical needs but also 
to patients' needs to decide how these physical needs are to be 
satisfied. 
The advances in medical science have markedly improved the 
benefits that patients can derive from diagnostic and therapeutic inter­
ventions unheard of only a few decades ago, but these very same ad­
vances not only increase opportunities for choice among treatment 
alternatives but also expose patients to different, and at times consider­
able, known and unknown risks. Yet, the availability of choice and 
the danger of inflicting pain and suffering have not moved physicians 
* John A. Garver Professor of Law and Psychoanalysis, Yale Law School; B.A., 
University of Vermont, 1944; M.D., Harvard Medical School, 1949. 
1. J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984) [hereinafter 
Katz]. 
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to consider seriously the question: When must choice be delegated to 
patients? Instead, physicians still maintain that decisionmaking is 
their prerogative. However, what was true for the dark ages of 
medicine, when doctors had little more to offer than caring comfort, is 
not true for the age of medical science, when doctors' ministrations 
can both ameliorate and increase suffering. 
In these concluding remarks I shall comment on only a few of the 
symposium's articles in an attempt to pursue further the new leads 
opened up by their thoughtful critique of my work. I am grateful to 
these contributors, as well as to the other authors whom I do not men­
tion, for their generous reading of my work. All took seriously my 
admonition that, if what I have done has merit, it must be extended 
beyond where I left off. 
My book, now three years old, has been cited in many articles and 
books. Their authors have come almost exclusively from the ranks of 
non-physicians. I mention this fact to address first one criticism of my 
work: that my emphasis on physicians' obligations to ensure fidelity 
to joint decisionmaking was a mistake. 2 Instead, I should have written 
a book for patients, if only because doctors would not readily change 
deeply ingrained convictions without outside pressure. 
My critics felt that the focus on physicians' responsibilities not 
only "[betrays] vestiges of paternalism"3 but also "subtly reinforces 
the very dependency of the patient [on the physician]."4 These con­
cerns have merit. I should have addressed more explicitly what pa­
tients can and must do in order to facilitate giving their voices a more 
respectful hearing in medical decisionmaking. Indeed, I should have 
said more about patients' responsibility to change existing practices 
because I already believed then, as I feel even more strongly now, that 
the medical profession will not readily change habits of silence unless 
forced to do so by citizen-patients. 
However, many reasons-some more important than others-led 
me to proceed as I did. First and foremost, I wanted to demonstrate 
that the idea of informed consent,5 i. e., that patients share the burdens 
2. See Baron, On Knowing One's Chains and Decking Them with Flowers: Limits on 
Patient Autonomy in "The Silent World of Doctor and Patient," 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 
31, 40 n.8 (1987); Caplan, Can We Talk? A Review of Jay Katz, "The Silent World of 
Doctor and Patient," 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 43, 50 (1987). 
3. Baron, supra note 2, at 40 n.8. 
4. Id.; Caplan, supra note 2, at 50. 
5. "[O]ne must draw sharp distinctions between the legal doctrine [of informed con­
sent], as promulgated by judges, and the idea of informed consent, based on a commitment 
to individual self-determination." KATZ, supra note I, at xvi. 
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of decision with their doctors, is, to begin with, not a patient problem 
but a physician problem. For a considered judgment on patients' ca­
pacity for decisionmaking can be rendered only once it is determined 
that physicians have the capacity for conversing with patients about the 
medical decisions that need to be made. These are problems not only 
regarding physicians' willingness to learn an unaccustomed new lan­
guage, and then to talk with patients, but also regarding physicians' 
willingness to confront and come to terms with medical uncertainty 
(pp. 165-206). 
The more I reflect about doctor-patient communication, the more 
convinced I become that in this modem age of medical science which 
for the first time permits sharing with patients the uncertainties of di­
agnosis, treatment, and prognosis, the problem of uncertainty poses 
the most formidable obstacle to disclosure and consent. For sharing 
uncertainties requires a willingness to admit ignorance about benefits 
and risks; to profess to the existence of alternatives, each with its own 
known and unknown consequences; to eschew one single authoritative 
recommendation; to consider carefully how to present uncertainties so 
that patients will not become overwhelmed by the information they 
are required to know; and to explore the crucial question of how much 
uncertainty physicians themselves can tolerate without compromising 
their effectiveness as healers. 
Physicians' unexamined conviction that patients, by virtue of 
their anxieties over being ill and medicine's esoteric knowledge, are 
incapable of participating in sharing the burdens of decision with their 
doctors, has made confrontation with uncertainty, at least to the ex­
tent of making patients aware of its ubiquitous presence, unnecessary. 
Thus, the at best groping, half-hearted, thoughtless and misleading at­
tempts to inform patients about uncertainty have made doctors' com­
munications confusing and incomprehensible. No wonder that 
patients appear stupid and ignorant; no wonder that patients say with 
resignation: "You are the doctor, you decide." 
Second, I also wanted to demonstrate that physicians' unques­
tioned convictions that non-disclosure serves patients' interests best 
make it impossible to distinguish between those patients who wish and 
those who do not wish to be taken into doctors' confidence. It may 
tum out, once patients are provided with the opportunity of sharing 
the burdens of decision, that many will decline; but certainly not all 
will. The latter need to be identified so that their voices can be ac­
corded the respect they deserve. 
The arguments that patients long ago would have insisted on ex­
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ercising their right to participate in decisionmaking had they wished to 
do so, or that their not doing so is evidence of a felt need, when sick 
and anxious, to place themselves trustingly into physicians' care, I find 
unpersuasive. These arguments prove too much. 
Patients, when sick, are indeed scared, particularly since illness 
tends to bring to the surface fears of death and concerns over mortal­
ity that otherwise are repressed. These fears and concerns are mobil­
ized even though the particular illness may not be life-threatening. 
They are also wittingly and unwittingly exploited by physicians in or­
der to ensure compliance.6 Death's hovering presence as a third party 
to physician-patient encounters invites surrender lest, if one offends 
physicians by imposing on their time or questioning their recommen­
dations, they will be less willing to stand by in the hour of ultimate 
need and gently ferry patients across the river Styx to their final rest­
ing place. 
However unjustified such fears may be, they are real fears; fears 
that are reinforced by physicians' all too common silent, and not so 
silent, resort to threats of abandonment: "If you are unwilling to ac­
cept my recommendation, why don't you seek out another physician?" 
In this climate joint decisionmaking becomes virtually impossible. 
Physicians must learn to put their patients at ease about the remote­
ness of death or the unlikelihood of serious consequences to their well­
being when such outcomes are not in issue, and about their fears of 
abandonment, when they question their physicians too closely. 
It remains equally unclear to what extent "[p]aternalism exists in 
medicine ... to fulfill a need created by illness"7 and to what extent it 
fulfills a need created by physicians. In not dispelling patients' imagi­
nary fears, in keeping patients in the dark about their medical condi­
tion, and in treating patients in many other ways as children and not 
as adults, doctors wittingly and unwittingly reinforce the regressive 
6. 	 In The Silent World of Doctor and Patient, I state: 
The silence that surrounds death, however, does not only reside in the dis­
comfort that the topic engenders. Physicians' silence also serves the purpose of 
reinforcing their authority over patients. Doctors have an intriguing love-hate 
relationship with death: It is both their ally and their enemy. In trying to defeat 
death, physicians are death's adversaries. When physicians borrow the power 
engendered by patients' fear of death for purposes of control, death is their ally. 
Doctors often wittingly and unwittingly exploit the anxieties and fears that even 
benign illness engenders in patients by conveying, if not with words then by de­
meanor, that not following their orders will accelerate death. 
KATZ, supra note 1, at 213-14. 
7. Duffy, Agamemnon's Fate and the Medical Profession, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 
21, 27 (\987). 
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pull engendered by illness. Thus, the contributions which illness or 
physicians make to "the need for paternalism" remain unknown. In 
turn, we do not know whether physician-patient interactions that rec­
ognize patients as the adults they are will not reverse the regressive 
pull that illness also mobilizes. 
Third, I also wanted to demonstrate that meaningful conversation 
between doctors and patients requires physicians to re-examine the an­
cient notion that they and their patients have an identity of interests in 
medical matters and that, therefore, physicians can make decisions for 
patients. Of course, both seek restoration of health and cure and 
whenever such ends are readily attainable by only one route, their in­
terests indeed do coincide. However, in many physician-patient en­
counters, cure has many faces and the means selected affect the nature 
of cure in decisive ways.8 
Consider, for example, a patient with a fibroid uterus who 
presents herself with a complaint of intermittent, increased bleeding 
during menses. Cure can mean a hysterectomy, or reassurance that no 
dire result will follow from living with the condition, or the employ­
ment of various medical means to bring the bleeding at least under 
partial control. If the last course of treatment is adopted, some of the 
medical interventions could expose the patient to future, as yet un­
known, risks. Beyond that problem, doctors and patients may differ 
about the value they ascribe to retaining or parting with an organ that 
has myriads of symbolic meanings. Clinical examples of the multiplic­
ity of ends attainable and means available for the treatment of medical 
conditions are numerous, a result of the spectacular advances in medi­
cal science. Thus, the question: what constitutes cure? Identity of 
interest about ends and means cannot be assumed. It can be estab­
lished only through respectful conversation. 
The fear that respecting patients' choices may jeopardize a good 
medical outcome also requires careful reflection. As I have suggested 
already, what constitutes a good medical outcome is not as readily 
apparent as is often assumed.9 Not only can physicians and patients 
differ on this question but physicians themselves come to this question 
with differing convictions. Again, is removal or retention of a uterus 
8. For a perceptive discussion of ends and means in lawyer-client relationships, see 
Spiegel, Lawyers and Professional Autonomy: Reflections on Corporate Lawyering and the 
Doctrine of Informed Consent, 9 w. NEW ENG. L. REV. 139, 145-46, 148 (1987). 
9. See Duffy, supra note 7, at 30: "A poor medical outcome should not be allowed to 
evolve due to respect for autonomy." But what is a good medical outcome? When does 
"the doctor ... [know what is] best ... [and when is it] arrogance if he or she adheres to 
that adage and acts in a patient's behalf ...?" Id. at 24. 
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for fibroids the "good" medical decision? Is treatment or non-treat­
ment of essential hypertension of moderate degree a "good" medical 
decision? 
My emphasis on patient autonomy and choice does not under­
mine physicians' "moral authority."10 Physicians' authority resides in 
their capacity to heal, not in making decisions for others. While phy­
sicians may have needed to usurp decisionmaking authority during the 
dark ages of medicine, the exercise of such authority has no place in 
the age of medical science. 
Of course, medical practice has "underpinnings of certainty"ll ­
the result of the great scientific advances during the last one hundred 
years-but science also has made physicians aware of the uncertainties 
and ignorance that stalk medical practice. 12 Science also has given 
physicians the capacity to distinguish better between certainty and un­
certainty. Moreover, physicians embrace science's abiding commit­
ment to the search for truth which raises the question: why should not 
this commitment to truth extend to conversations with patients? 
The moral authority of physicians to make decisions on behalf of 
patients requires a more precise and restrictive definition. In physi­
cian-patient interactions there probably is room for some discretion in 
what to tell and not to tell patients or in making decisions for patients, 
10. But see Duffy, supra note 7, at 25: Katz's "perception represents a loss of honor 
for a profession which once was thought to possess moral authority and discretion." 
II. Id. at 24. But see infra note 12. 
12. For example, Lewis Thomas, a physician deeply committed to the practice of 
scientific medicine, noted: 
The only solid piece of scientific truth about which I feel totally confident is that 
we are profoundly ignorant about nature. Indeed, I regard this as the major dis­
covery of the past hundred years of biology. . .. It is this sudden confrontation 
with the depth and scope of ignorance that represents the most significant contri­
bution of twentieth-century science to the human intellect. We are, at last, facing 
up to it. In earlier times, we either pretended to understand how things worked or 
ignored the problem or simply made up stories to fill the gaps. 
L. THOMAS, THE MEDUSA AND THE SNAIL: MORE NOTES OF A BIOLOGY WATCHER 73­
74 (1979). 

In a New York Times article, Thomas stated: 

The scientific method is guesswork, the making up of stories. The difference 
between this and other imaginative works of the human mind is that science is 
then obliged to find out whether the guesses are correct, the stories true. Curios­
ity drives the enterprise, and the open acknowledgment of ignorance. [W]e know 
very little about nature and we understand even less. 
Starting with ourselves, and the life immediately around us, we have lots of home­
work to do, lots of pride to swallow, lots more ignorance to face, some of it only 
sensed out of the comer of the eye .... 
Thomas, How Should Humans Pay Their Way? N. Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1981, at A15, cols. 
2-5. 
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but this discretion must be defined and circumscribed more clearly lest 
it will continue to be abused. 
Why should this moral authority give physicians the right to 
make choices for patients? Does not this moral authority belong to 
patients, particularly when choices are available, when each choice is 
influenced by medical and other value judgments, when the risk-bene­
fit ratio is unclear, and when uncertainty rules medical practice? It is 
hubris to answer this question by supporting medical authority merely 
on an assertion of beneficence and altruism. 13 It is equally dangerous 
to usurp this authority on the ground that patients' "best interests" 
demand that doctors assume this responsibility. The history of man­
kind gives telling evidence of the harm done in the name of "best 
interest." The "protection" in the name of "best interest," extended to 
slaves, women, the mentally ill, and juvenile delinquents are examples 
in point. 
However, there is more; for behind physicians' fears of compro­
mising a good medical outcome by acknowledging uncertainty and re­
specting patient self-determination, lie even greater fears: that patients 
will halt therapy prematurely and will choose instead "an unneces­
sary, albeit autonomous, ... [bad outcome or even] death."14 
We do not know whether patients will so choose. Such instances 
need to be collected and analyzed in depth, in the same way that phy­
sicians do in situations when patients, while under the care of their 
physicians, inexplicably suffer from major physical morbidities or un­
expectedly die. 
In instances of patients' opting for an unnecessary bad outcome 
or death, we must find out what, if anything, went wrong. Were such 
decisions the result of a patient's preference that the particular attend­
ing physician or the entire medical community thought to be a wrong 
choice? Were such decisions due to misunderstandings about what 
was at stake that had not been clarified during conversations between 
doctors and patient? Or were such decisions the result of different 
13. In the Silent World ofDoctor and Patient, I explain: 
Altruism, to the extent it exists, can only promise that doctors will try to place 
their patients' medical needs over their own personal needs. Even such a promise 
is extraordinarily difficult to fulfill in today's medical world which places such 
high value on economic rewards. Yet, even in the absence of any self-serving 
motivations altruism cannot promise that, without conversation, physicians will 
know what patients' needs are or that, without conversation, patients will know 
in what differing ways doctors can meet their needs. 
KATZ, supra note 1, at 95. 
14. Duffy, supra note 7, at 26. 
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value preferences about longevity in the face of chronic illness or dif­
ferent trade oirs between prolongation and quality of life? 
Physicians' concerns that patients may opt for a bad outcome or 
death also overlook that the wish to live as long and as free from suf­
fering as possible is a compelling motivation for all human beings. 
While persons may engage in all kinds of ill-considered and hazardous 
conduct-smoking, mountain climbing-that can foreshorten life, 
once confronted with the choice of death or a medical intervention 
that will preserve life and well-being, they will, absent a severe mental 
disorder, choose the former except for the most compelling reasons. I 
doubt that physicians often will be faced with such stand oirs if they 
learn to communicate better with their patients, take the time to dispel 
misunderstandings, and appreciate, in cases of disagreement, that con­
siderable merit may reside in their patients' choice. The desire to live 
is very powerful, and patients will not lightly opt for death. 
All that I have said so far seeks to lend additional sUpport15 to my 
contention that "physicians must take the initiative and lead the way" 
(p. 229) in implementing the idea of mutual decisionmaking. When 
needy patients appear before them, physicians, by virtue of their 
knowledge and power, can manipulate disclosures and exploit needi­
ness if they wish to do S016 and thus make a mockery of joint 
decisionmaking. 
As I have suggested already, only if doctors become committed to 
sharing the burdens of decision can it be ascertained whether patients 
have the capacity for choice. My emphasis on physicians' responsibil­
ity to take the "initiative," however, could have been misunderstood. 
15. These issues I discuss at length throughout The Silent World of Doctor and Pa­
tient. See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 1, Chapter IV "Sharing Authority: The Willingness to 
Trust," at 85-103; Chapter VI "Respecting Autonomy: The Obligation for Conversation," 
at 130-64; Chapter VII "Acknowledging Uncertainty: The Confrontation of Knowledge 
and Ignorance," at 165-206. 
16. Specifically, in The Silent World ofDoctor and Patient, I note: 
[W]hat passes today for disclosure and consent in physician-patient interactions is 
largely an unwitting attempt by physicians to shape the disclosure process so that 
patients will comply with their recommendations. In a recent discussion on in­
formed consent, a group of senior surgeons seemed genuinely puzzled by the 
"quaint" informed consent rule, particularly since they were certain that they 
could always guide patients to accept the treatment they had selected for them. 
"Why," they asked, "should we be forced to go through a ritual that ultimately 
accomplishes so little?" I responded by asking them how they would react if law 
at some time in the future attempted through informed consent to make patients 
co-decision makers? They thought that such an objective would be totally unreal­
istic, if not dangerous. "Patients," they asserted, "do not have the capacity to 
make medical decisions." 
KATZ, supra note 1, at 26-27. 
215 1987] "ON A DARKLING PLAIN" 
I was not trying to suggest that doctors now should, take charge of 
decisionmaking and impose it on patients. I only wished to under­
score that patients' willingness to make decisions and capacity to do so 
can be ascertained only once physicians are willing "to facilitate pa­
tients' opportunities for reflection" (p. 122) about the choices available 
to them. I repeatedly stated in my book that while 
the posited obligation to converse introduces an element of pater­
nalism into my prescription, [it must also be recognized that] the 
obligations I advocate are imposed on both parties; they do not ask 
for one party to submit to the other; they are grounded in mutual­
ity; and they are dictated by a respect for human psychological 
functioning in the specific context of physician-patient decisionmak­
ing ... (p. 128). 
In today's world, it is virtually impossible for patients to have a 
meaningful input on choice. The withholding and manipulation of in­
formation to ensure compliance with doctors' recommendations are 
too ubiquitous. If viewed from the perspective of disclosure and con­
sent, such practices unite the medical profession in a conspiracy to 
exclude patients from decisionmaking. Physicians engage in this con­
spiracy not for nefarious reasons but out of abiding, although unexam­
ined, convictions that unquestioned trust, obedience, and compliance 
are essential ingredients for good patient care.J7 Patients find such 
convictions hard to challenge, particularly in solitary encounters with 
their doctors when physicians are also perceived as wishing to do good 
and as resenting any challenge to their goodness, even though good 
intentions are not what patients seek to question. 
Moreover, since the medical profession has always extolled trust, 
obedience, and compliance as virtues and not vices, any desire on the 
part of patients to join in deliberations that can vitally affect patients' 
lives runs counter to how their own parents allowed themselves to be 
treated and how, in turn, the present generation of patients was social­
ized. They learned silent "participation" from the first time they and 
their parents visited their pediatricians' offices and they observed their 
17. Caplan worries "that physicians ... [may become] blinded by their anger at ... 
[Katz's] suggestion that they have somehow consciously plotted against the public to main­
tain the norm of silence in an effort to secure wealth, prestige, and autonomy for them­
selves." Caplan, supra note 2, at 46-47. While all these considerations playa role, they are 
not the major reasons for the silence that pervades physician-patient relations. As I have 
emphasized repeatedly, doctors are deeply committed to the idea that patients' medical 
interests are best served if they follow doctors' orders. This unexamined conviction guides 
physicians' conduct, even though "there is some evidence that demonstrates that compli­
ance and obedience are facilitated not by blind trust and obedience to authority, but rather 
by informed human beings who recognize each other's fallibility and limits." Id. 
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parents' deference. 18 Thus, patients readily feel guilty if they wish to 
change practices to which they have been exposed since childhood and 
to which their parents had acquiesced. They may ask themselves: 
"Are we doing something wrong in asking for something different? Is 
it merely oppositional? Is it bad medicine?" 
The medical profession must take the initiative and proclaim that 
patient participation in decisionmaking is intrinsically good and desir­
able. Until physicians so proclaim we cannot know whether "patients 
have allowed silence to substitute for conversation as a result of a con­
viction ... that healing can be brought about only when the patient 
exemplifies the virtues of trust, obedience and compliance" 19 or 
whether this conviction is the result of doctors' insistence that patients 
surrender themselves to trust, obedience and compliance in order to 
enhance the effectiveness of treatment. 
The proposition that "[m]edical uncertainty and ignorance have 
long been seen as the primary threats to patient hope, and thus to the 
efficacy of medical interventions, not just by physicians but by their 
patients as well,"20 requires careful scrutiny. I am not sure whether 
this perceived threat to patients' hope is not a threat to physicians' 
need to appear hopeful. Indeed, uncertainty and even ignorance, if 
frankly admitted, do not necessarily have to stifle hope. For admission 
of uncertainty and ignorance attests not only to the hazards of predic­
tion (and in the absence of prediction, hope remains alive) but also to 
our ignorance about vis medicatrix naturae (the healing power of na­
ture) (p. 196) and its contribution, often in inexplicable ways, to the 
prolongation of life. 
18. See Katz, Who's Afraid of Informed Consent? 4 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 315, 316 
(1976). 
Patients are afraid of informed consent because it seems to contradict their all too 
ready propensity for childlike surrender to the authority of experts. Patients' awe 
of experts has been deeply ingrained in them from the time of their first 
remembered visits to the pediatrician's office where they observed how easily the 
doctor could make obedient children out of their powerful parents. 
Id. 
19. Caplan notes that "[p]atients have allowed silence to substitute for conversation 
as a result of a conviction, shared and reinforced by their doctors, that healing can only be 
brought about when the patient exemplifies the virtues of trust, obedience and compliance." 
Caplan, supra note 2, at 45 (emphasis added). Caplan is correct that I am "less willing to 
grant, that it is their [the doctors'] clientele who have been equally eager to have someone 
occupy ... [the] social niche ... [of authority-once organized religion's authority de­
clined]." Id. We do not know whether patients have been compelled to submit to medical 
authority because organized medicine provided them with no alternative but to submit, 
unless they wished to turn to healers who did not possess the technical training of M.D. ­
physicians. 
20. Id. 
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Expressions of spurious hope can be self-defeating when they fly 
in the face of a deteriorating medical condition, and they can reinforce 
silence on part of the patient-born out of disbelief and unwillingness 
to call the physician a liar-and, in turn, on the part of the physi­
cian-born out of guilt over compounding lies with lies. We do not 
even know what expressions of hope patients expect from physicians. 
It may not be hope of cure-dying patients may have at least an intui­
tive appreciation of the impossibility of cure-but the hope that physi­
cians will continue to do their level best to spare patients undue pain 
and discomfort; that they will stand by and not abandon patients.21 
If, however, the answer turns out to be that patients themselves 
prefer silent trust, obedience, and compliance, that "patients are [in­
different] or even [hostile] to full participation in the conversations 
that guide medical encounters,"22 then disclosure and consent will 
remain an empty ritual, a charade. Far better then to dispense with 
disclosure and consent and reassert the authority of physicians to 
make decisions for patients. A half-hearted commitment to disclosure 
and consent will only make deception worse by giving patients, and 
doctors as well, the impression that a decision was made jointly when 
indeed it was not. It is a most grievous deception, unseemly in any 
interactions between human beings. 
This brings me to criticisms of my work that are the result of 
issues that I barely considered or inadequately explored. First, I 
should have acknowledged more fully than I did my own dis-ease over 
carving out an exception to uncompromising respect for patients' 
choices on the ground of a serious impairment in the process of think­
ing about choices (pp. 156-63).23 It is a narrow exception, for 
I would [only] consider disobeying a patient's choice when two con­
ditions have been met: One, the consequences of non-intervention 
pose grave risks to a patient's immediate physical condition and, two, 
the process of thinking about choices is so seriously impaired that 
neither physician nor patient seem to know what one or both wish 
21. I suggest in The Silent World of Doctor and Patient that: 
[P]atients hope that physicians can be trusted to observe carefully, to treat them 
with care, to alleviate unnecessary suffering, to discuss with them the implications 
of uncertainty's inevitable presence, to give the unpredictable forces of nature a 
helping hand, and, above all, to remain honestly present and not abandon patients 
when they need them most. 
KATZ, supra note 1, at 194. See also KATZ, supra note 1, Chapter VIII "The Abandon­
ment of Patients: A Final Argument Against Silence," at 207-29. 
22. Caplan, supra note 2, at 45. 
23. The entire article by Baron is devoted to a perceptive reanalysis of this exception, 
also in the context of my imaginary conversation with Mr. D. See Baron, supra note 2. 
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to convey to the other. With respect to the first condition, I would 
limit interferences with patients' choices to illnesses for which avail­
able diagnostic and therapeutic interventions have a reasonable 
chance of preventing death or predictable, serious, and irreversible 
physical injuries in instances when death or injury would occur 
within a relatively short period of time. (The emphasis on serious 
physical consequences seeks to balance the values of respect for self­
determination and well-being. The emphasis on the time factor 
seeks to acknowledge that it can take time to clarify confusion and 
misconceptions. For example, time may not be available when, 
without intervention, death or injury are imminent.) The first con­
dition, however, is only a necessary one for intervention, it is not 
decisive by itself. Interference with patients' choices must also meet 
another test: The process of thinking about choices must be seri­
ously impaired (pp. 157-58).24 
I was tempted to omit this section but ultimately I was unwilling to do 
so, even though I knew that the exception would invite criticism and 
could easily be construed as giving physicians greater license than I 
had intended. 
My exception is not a retreat to paternalism but a recognition of 
the fact that any good principle that defines human conduct can never 
rule absolute. Of course, the danger exists, as is true for any departure 
from principle, that if license is taken it will be expanded beyond its 
rightful limits. The temptation needs to be resisted by the most careful 
review of cases in which the exception has been applied. 
On further reflection, criticism of my bow to paternalism 
notwithstanding, I still believe that the exception must stand for one 
major reason: 
[T]he right to self-determination about ultimate choices cannot be 
properly exercised without first attending to the processes of self­
reflection and reflection with others. This holds true for patients as 
well as for physicians. Contrary views have paid insufficient respect 
not only to human proclivities for unconscious and irrational deci­
sion making but also, and more importantly, to the possibilities of 
bringing some of these determinants to greater awareness. Such 
views on autonomy and self-determination do not pay respect to 
"self-defined" individuals; instead, such views inhibit opportunities 
for women and men to become clearer about how they may wish to 
define themselves, abandoning them instead to a malignant fate. In 
the context of physician-patient decision making, it must be recog­
nized that illness-including the fears and hopes it engenders, the 
24. (emphasis added). 
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ignorance in which it is embedded, the realistic and unrealistic ex­
pectations it mobilizes-can contribute to tilting the balance in pa­
tients and physicians further toward irrationality and choices that, 
on reflection, both might wish to reconsider. In short, I seek to 
justify the duty to reflection on the grounds of human beings' capac­
ities to take their unconscious and irrationality more fully into ac­
count (p. 124). 
In moments of crisis, when little time is available before serious irre­
versible harm is likely to occur and when neither physician nor patient 
seems to know what one or both wish to convey to the other, I would 
overrule patients' choices. The reason is that I have no idea, as in the 
case of Mr. D., whether acquiescing to his refusal to talk with me 
constitutes respect for his autonomy in the sense in which I define it. 
However, despite the need for the exception, I must have been 
uneasy when I put it on paper. Otherwise, I would have been less 
"impersonal, unemotional and deontological"25 in the way in which I 
phrased my imaginary dialogue with Mr. D.26 I might then have been 
more forthright about my feelings of impotence in the face of his re­
fusal to talk. I might have considered telling him: "Try to see things 
my way; [w]ould you be willing to ... [talk to me], [p]lease!"27 These 
are good suggestions, but what if the patient had persisted in his re­
fusal, what then? Should I not have intervened? I could not have 
stood by and let him die. 
Thus, I admit to my dis-ease over the exception, yet I cannot 
eliminate it. Paternalism cannot be banished completely. It is a pater­
nalism, however, not based on notions of mental health or illness,28 
but on basic assumptions about the psychological nature of human 
25. Baron, supra note 2, at 38. 
26. Baron cites in considerable detail my imaginary conversation with Mr. D. Id. at 
37-38. 
27. Id. at 38. 
28. I did not wish to suggest that physicians might now "force such treatment on 
patients where mental health demanded it." Id. at 33. In his book, LEGAL FRONTIERS OF 
DEATH AND DYING, Norman Cantor states: 
Professor Jay Katz, a staunch advocate of informed consent, suggests an interest­
ing limitation on a patient's prerogative to decline life-saving medical treatment. 
He contends that a competent patient ought to be entitled to reject such treatment 
even for a "foolish" or "unwise" reason-so long as the patient articulates some 
reason for his decision. If the patient insists on rejecting life-saving treatment 
"without any explanation," Professor Katz would be inclined to override the pa­
tient's determination. 
The motivation behind the Katz position is certainly commendable. It is 
aimed at assuring that the patient's decision is a truly informed one. The physi­
cian seeks to know what motivates the patient to make a seemingly unreasoned 
decision, in order to at least try and confront the patient's objections to treatment. 
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beings. These assumptions led me to make distinctions between think­
ing about choices and choice itselp9 as well as to allow for the rare 
exception of overruling choice when reflection about choice is im­
paired. Paradoxical as it may sound, I did so because of the high value 
I place on autonomy, an autonomy that is not defined solely by a "no" 
or "yes" response. 30 
There can be no quarrel with the effort to engage the patient in careful 
conversation about his life-rejecting determination. The question is, what follows 
if the patient persists in his refusal to explain his decision. My own preference 
would be to respect the patient's refusal so long as a conscientious determination 
can be made-based on the patient's general demeanor and the other conversa­
tions - that the patient is competent. This would be so even in the rare instance 
when the patient chooses to cloud his ultimate motivations in silence. 
N. CANTOR, LEGAL FRONTIERS OF DEATH AND DYING 25 (1987) (emphasis added). 
Cantor suggests that the decision whether to respect a patient's choice ultimately should 
also depend on an evaluation of his or her competence. But see Katz, Can Principles Sur­
vive in Situations of Critical Care? in ETHICS AND CRITICAL CARE 4-67 (J. C. Moskop & 
L. Kopelman eds. 1985). 
[U]nilateral assessments [of competence by psychiatric consultants] that implic­
itly, if not explicitly, stress the patient's irrationality and not the physician's can 
readily compromise mutual exploration from its very beginning. They tend to 
fuel a patient's resentment over not being taken seriously, over having to establish 
his credentials as a competent person, however much unintended by the physician 
. . . . Required instead is a bilateral conversation between doctor and patient that 
explores their expectations of one another, that identifies their misconceptions, 
their confusions and, most importantly, that seeks to clarify why they wish differ­
ent things from one another. All this must be done in the spirit not of assessing, 
evaluating, or judging anything but of better understanding one another. 
Id. at 51-52. 
29. Self-determination contains ... two intertwined, though separable ideas. 
One looks at conduct in relation to the external world, at conduct in relation to 
action. I call this external component of self-determination choice. It has also 
been spoken of as freedom of action. The other looks at conduct in relation to the 
internal world, at conduct in relation to thinking about choices by oneself and 
with others prior to action. I call this internal component of self-determination 
reflection or thinking about choices. Traditionally, discussions of self-determina­
tion have emphasized the external component. I shall argue instead that both the 
external and internal components deserve equal and separate consideration. 
KATZ, supra note 1, at 110-11. 
30. [T]he requirement for conversation creates inevitable conflicts with the right 
to privacy-the right to keep one's thoughts and feelings to oneself. Thus, the 
imposition of an obligation to converse is disrespectful of the right to have one's 
initial choice, including the right not to converse, honored. Refusals to converse, 
however, totally obscure both patients' and doctors' understanding of how they 
arrived at their decision. This is particularly true when patients either decline a 
needed medical intervention or accept it unquestioningly. Respect for psycholog­
ical autonomy becomes severely compromised when refusals or acceptances are 
heeded without question. Here the principle of privacy must bend to psychologi­
cal autonomy. (This may turn out to be a rare Hobson's choice, for I expect that 
most patients, if invited by their physicians, will welcome conversation.) 
KATZ, supra note I, at 127-28. 
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Second, I should have written more on the role of patients' family 
members in the decisionmaking process.31 Particularly when patients 
and physicians disagree, family members' assistance in clarifying mat­
ters should, of course, be invited. Family members can perform the 
important function of explaining to their loved ones what is at stake. 
Since they know the patient more intimately, they may perform this 
task more easily than the physician. They perhaps can find the words 
to make the patient understand.32 
Family members, ministers, priests, rabbis, social workers, 
nurses, and friends have important roles to play in the process of re­
flecting about choices but they cannot, they must not, be allowed to 
veto the patient's decision.33 The ultimate choice belongs to the pa­
tient, not only on the grounds of self-determination and autonomy, 
although that alone is sufficient, but also on the ground that patients' 
and their families' interests do not necessarily coincide, just as physi­
cians' and patients' interests are not necessarily identical. This holds 
true whether the families' decision is for or against treatment. 
Third, I also did not explore the question whether disclosure and 
consent should rule absolute in all doctor-patient interactions. Per­
haps, at this early stage in the life of informed consent, imposition of 
such an absolute rule is asking far too much. Indeed, for some time I 
have wondered whether one unitary informed consent doctrine can 
ever serve well all situations encompassed by the practice of medicine. 
It may make sense to develop a variety of informed consent doctrines 
for various well-defined subgroups of medical practice. Let me briefly 
describe four such possible subgroups: 
(1) For relatively minor, time-limited disorders for which treat­
ments are available that do not expose patients to undue risks, e.g., the 
common cold, non-specific headaches, or certain dermatological disor­
ders, informed consent, for the time being, could be dispensed with 
altogether. 34 
31. Arthur Dyck correctly points to this omission and makes many perceptive com­
ments about the "network of relations" that can assist patients in achieving "an unimpaired 
process of thinking about choices." Dyck, Self-Determination and Moral Responsibility, 9 
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 53, 58 (1987). 
32. Dyck gives a number of examples that demonstrate the contributions family 
members can make to the process of thinking about choices. In two instances these contri­
butions led the patients to reconsider decision against treatment. Id. at 58-59. 
33. But see id. at 59. Dyck also states, "Moral responsibility may sometimes, how­
ever, demand that physicians and family members oppose a choice even though the process 
of making the choice does not seem impaired." Id. 
34. Note the qualifying phrase "for the time being." Eventually this sub-group 
should also be covered by its own rule of informed consent. I only suggest that informed 
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(2) For acute disorders, e.g., myocardial infarctions that require 
immediate intervention as well as keeping the patient as anxiety-free as 
possible, the informed consent process may have to be curtailed. Joint 
decisionmaking may have to be limited to a few essential matters 
about diagnosis and treatment. 
(3) For elective procedures, e.g., hysterectomies, tonsillecto­
mies, and cholecystectomies, or procedures for which a variety of 
treatment (and no treatment) options are available and there is no rush 
to proceed, joint decisionmaking should become an absolute rule, un­
less patients opt for delegating decisionmaking to their physicians. 
However, 'prior to accepting this responsibility physicians should 
make reasonable inquiries in order to determine whether responsibility 
is delegated out of fear of offending them, concern about imposing on 
their time, or patients' lack of knowledge necessary to ask the ques­
tions that need to be asked. Patients must be reassured that doctors 
are willing to take the time to talk, and that doctors are prepared to 
provide the necessary background information so that patients can ask 
appropriate questions. In elective procedures informed consent is a 
sine que non. Disclosure and consent will lead to fewer interventions 
and contribute to reducing the staggering cost of health care. 
(4) For conditions, e.g., cancers, in which prognosis is dire and 
fatal outcome a likely prospect, the extent of physicians' disclosure 
and obtaining patients' consent may be ascertainable only after physi­
cians have probed patients' reactions to knowing fully the implications 
of their disease on life expectancy. Physicians should be guided by the 
strongest presumption in favor of disclosure and consent, which can be 
modified only by clear and carefully documented evidence that pa­
tients do not wish to be fully informed. 
While in recent decades physicians increasingly have revealed the 
diagnosis of malignancy to patients, little has changed with respect to 
discussing with patients therapeutic options and prognosis. In light of 
the spectacular advances in the treatment of cancer, for example, dis­
closure of diagnosis has become inevitable so that physicians can em­
ploy the treatment modalities now available to patients. At the same 
time, the risks and benefits of these therapies-their impact on quality 
of life, their often experimental nature, or the fact that choices can be 
made among many alternatives, including the alternative of no treat-
consent be dispensed with for the time being, to highlight (1) the greater importance of 
developing informed consent doctrines for the other three groups; and (2) the crucial im­
portance of physicians acknowledging that no informed consent is sought or being ob­
tained, and not giving the appearance that disclosures are made and consent is being 
obtained when this is not the case. 
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ment-are still all too rarely explored with patients and subjected to 
joint decisionmaking. 
Thus, non-disclosure has merely shifted from diagnosis to therapy 
and prognosis. Whatever the merits of deeply held convictions that 
hope must be maintained for patients' benefit and that patients do not 
wish to be informed about their dire circumstances, it is equally clear 
that physicians have given insufficient attention to the possibility that 
many, or at least a significant number of patients, prefer to know what 
is in store for them. 
Nor do we know whether physicians' acknowledgment of the sad 
fact that only a "scant menu of options,"35 are available, i.e., "choices 
about slow and rapid death, painful and less painful death, "36 will be 
preferred by patients, rather than the withholding of such information. 
Patients may know more about their conditions than physicians appre­
ciate and resent that they have been silently condemned to end life in 
pain and without any control over how to live their lives during their 
last months in this world. We do not know how patients feel because 
physicians have not tried to consult them. Once departed, patients' 
feelings are buried with their corpses. 
Moreover, we know all too little about dying patients' capacities 
to deny, repress, and engage in magical thinking about their illnesses, 
if they wish to defend themselves against a full realization of their 
hopeless conditions. Those who are so inclined will resort to these 
adaptive and defensive mechanisms without being aided and abetted 
by their doctors. If physicians desist from shielding patients from the 
truth, it will become possible to distinguish better between patients 
who wish to employ their own defensive maneuvers and those who 
prefer to prepare for death with greater awareness. 
* * * * 
Matthew Arnold concluded his poem Dover Beach with these op­
timistic-pessimistic words: 
Ah, love, let us be true 
To one another! for the world, which seems 
To lie before us like a land of dreams, 
So various, so beautiful, so new, 
Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light, 
Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain; 
And we are here as on a darkling plain 
35. Caplan, supra note 2, at 50. 
36. Id. 
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Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight, 
Where ignorant armies clash by night. 37 
These are apt sentiments for what I have tried to explore in my inquir­
ies on informed consent and physician-patient decisionmaking. In to­
day's world, conversations between physicians and patients about 
medical choices are still conducted "on a darkling plain ... with con­
fused alarms of struggle and flight." 
I accept as a correct appreciation of my position the criticism that 
chides me for depicting physicians and patients too much as adversa­
ries38 and not as persons united in a common cause. In the current 
climate of medical decisionmaking, I indeed view physicians and pa­
tients as adversaries. But I also have been misunderstood about my 
depiction. I did not wish to imply that doctors, in their physical min­
istrations, are not deeply committed to doing their level best for their 
patients according to their best professional judgment. In that sense 
doctors are patients' friends and not their adversaries. 
Yet, it is according to doctors' best judgments that patients are 
cared for, and not necessarily according to their patients' best judg­
ment. The two mayor may not coincide. Paradoxical as it may 
sound, it is precisely because of the tremendous advances in medical 
science during the last fifty years that physicians' objectives and those 
of patients have diverged more than was true in earlier times. As I 
have repeatedly emphasized, choice among a variety of medical op­
tions has become an integral part of the practice of modern medicine. 
Risks of treatment accompany benefits, and iatrogenic complications 
have also become an integral aspect of the practice of modern 
medicine. Quality of life problems have multiplied as physicians have 
developed techniques for keeping patients alive for longer and longer 
periods of time. 
With choice such a new development, a silent world of doctor and 
patient which precludes patient input into choices that can affect their 
physical and psychological well-being in decisive ways makes adversa­
ries out of them, because the treatment selected by the physicians may 
not comport with the patients' choice of treatment. Thus, doctor and 
patient can become engaged "in a struggle and flight," as Matthew 
Arnold so vividly depicts in a different context, where parties "igno­
rant" of their respective wishes can only "clash by night." 
The poet, in part, despaired: "The world ... so beautiful ... hath 
37. Arnold, "Dover Beach," in THE POETICAL WORKS OF MATTHEW ARNOLD 210 
(c. B. Tinker & H. F. Lowry eds. 1957). 
38. Duffy, supra note 7, at 24-25. 
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really neither joy, nor love ... nor certitude, nor help for pain ...." 
Yet, he began on an optimistic note, "[alh, love let us be true to one 
another ...." In these stanzas, he may have wished to hold out the 
hope that if two persons can learn to be true to one another, the world 
may yet become filled with joy and help for pain. 
In reflecting on this poem, I was reminded of the two corner­
stones of Greek medicine: philanthropia (love of man) and 
philotechnia (love of the art [of healing]).39 Such love requires trust. 
Yet, can trust flourish unless doctor and patient are true to one an­
other? Should it not be a trust based on truth and mutual assent 
rather than on obedience and compliance-the kind of trust that un­
derlies the idea of informed consent? Cannot such a trust be realized 
only if physicians cease to control their patients and, instead, learn to 
trust their patients as doctors wish to be trusted by their patients? Is 
not the true meaning of trust the capacity to trust oneself and the 
other? 
If the idea of informed consent were to govern physician-patient 
relations, physicians' moral authority would be based not only upon 
their expert knowledge to diagnose and treat but also upon an aware­
ness of the tragic limitations of their expert knowledge.4O They would 
then be forced to reflect more deeply on their moral responsibility to 
share with or withhold from patients both their knowledge and igno­
rance. Patients' moral authority would rest on their right to care for 
their bodies in their own ways, including delegation of that authority 
to their doctors. 
Fidelity to the idea of informed consent eschews physicians' uni­
lateral exercise of moral authority and shifts the focus to new ques­
tions: must not physicians, in light of their knowledge and ignorance, 
impress on patients that medical decisions are best made jointly? 
Must not patients learn that the moral authority to make choices be­
longs to them and not to their physicians? 
The contributors to this volume have wrestled hard with the 
problems of trust and mutuality between doctors and patients. If the 
39. P. ENTRALGO, DOCTOR AND PATIENT 45-51 (F. Partridge trans. 1969). 
40. As I state in The Silent World ofDoctor and Patient: 

[T]o trust patients, physicians first must learn to trust themselves to face up to 

and acknowledge the tragic limitations of their own professional knowledge; their 

inability to impart all their insights to all patients; and their own personal inca­

pacities - at times more pronounced than at others - to devote themselves fully 

to their patients' needs. They must also learn not to be unduly embarrassed by 

their personal and professional ignorance and to trust their patients to react ap­

propriately to such acknowledgments. 

KATZ, supra note 1, at 102-03. 
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authors' insights and recommendations41 will be subjected to further, 
relentless scrutiny, we may yet see the dawn of a new age in which 
physicians and patients will not encounter each other on "a darkling 
plain." 
41. I cannot conclude without apologizing for not commenting on all the articles 
that are part of this symposium. I of course was gratified that Professor Annas, Professor 
Johnson, Professor Miller, Jl'.dge Dunphy and Mr. Cross, and Professor Rhoden found my 
book useful in pursuit of their specific research interests; that Chief Justice Doolin incorpo­
rated my views in Scott v. Bradford; and that Professor Minow extended my observations to 
broader areas of human interaction. I can only acknowledge that I learned much from 
them, but to do justice to their contributions would have required writing another book. 
